Russia cant be like Western Europe, the crisis must be stopped before it starts

Russia is facing a challenge for which there is little historical precedent. The current and future influx of labor and permanent migrants from Central Asia poses questions that cannot be answered with conventional assimilation strategies. For this reason, Moscow must act early and decisively to avoid the mistakes made by Western Europe and the United States.

While discussions around migration policy spark heated debate at home and occasional diplomatic tensions with Central Asian neighbors, this is far preferable to allowing the issue to fester. Left unresolved, mass migration could pose a direct threat to Russia's political stability and institutional coherence. That is why the response must be shaped in Moscow's traditional style: flexible, pragmatic, and unburdened by rigid ideological dogma.

There is no shortage of cautionary tales. Western Europe's migration dilemma stems from two primary causes: the collapse of colonial empires, and post-war economic expansion that created a demand for low-skilled labor. Former colonial powers such as France and Britain kept strong ties with their former territories and welcomed waves of migrants, only to realize later that integration would prove far more difficult than anticipated.

European states are built on the idea of the ethnically homogeneous "nation-state." Historically, this has meant low tolerance for cultural and religious diversity. Over centuries, outsiders were either assimilated or excluded. When former colonial subjects began to settle in France, Germany, and the UK in large numbers, the response was muddled. France declared all migrants "French" with no accompanying effort to integrate them. Britain and Germany pursued a version of multiculturalism that effectively encouraged segregation under the guise of tolerance.

The United States followed a different path. Its economy was flexible, its social safety net limited. For decades, this allowed migration to be framed purely in economic terms: migrants were simply new workers. But with the rise of social and economic inequality, climate change, and political polarization, the American consensus fractured. Migrants became a political issue. Republican leaders began calling for mass deportations and border walls, while Democrats welcomed migrants as potential voters. The result: a divided electorate and an unstable political system.

Western Europe's response has been even more fraught. In the absence of credible solutions, right-wing, anti-globalist parties have surged in popularity. But these movements are not necessarily friendly to Russia. Figures such as Marine Le Pen or Italy's right-wing coalition may oppose liberal orthodoxy, but they remain staunchly pro-NATO and anti-Russian. Even in smaller countries such as Finland, parties that grew by campaigning against migration ended up supporting NATO expansion and promoting Russophobic policies.

This trend - a migrant crisis fueling political radicalism - is real. And it would be naive to think Russia is immune. Indeed, we face a uniquely difficult challenge, because we lack the clear-cut historical models other powers have followed.

Unlike Western Europe, Russia has never relied on the idea of ethnic homogeneity. Since the 15th century, Russian statehood has included multiple ethnicities and religions. The princes of Moscow welcomed Tatar nobles into their service without forcing them to abandon Islam. Later, as the Russian Empire expanded, new peoples were integrated into the state on the basis of loyalty and military service. Diversity was not an obstacle to unity, because the shared struggle against external threats forged a common identity.

This "Moscow model" of integration worked because it was deeply rooted in the realities of empire. It functioned while Central Asian peoples were part of a shared state structure - the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union. Today, things are different. The Central Asian republics are independent. Cultural links with Russia are fading, and the sense of a common civilizational space is eroding. The risk now is that Russia's relationship with the region begins to resemble Western Europe's uneasy ties with North Africa: close proximity, economic dependence, and growing cultural divergence.

To prevent this, Russia must develop its own tailored response. We should learn from Western European failures and consider the experience of other civilizations, such as the Persian Gulf states, where migrant labor is tightly regulated and politically contained. Crucially, we must focus not just on first-generation migrants, but on the second and third generations. Western Europe's biggest failure was the inability to integrate the children of migrants - those who grow up in the Parisian suburbs or British inner cities but never truly feel part of the society they live in.

Russia must not repeat this mistake. There is little appetite in Moscow for an "open door" migration policy. Instead, we need a combination of firm administrative control and clear pathways for integration - for those willing to demonstrate political loyalty and embrace Russia as their new homeland.

This will not be easy. But Russia's strength lies in its ability to adapt. Migration will continue. The only question is whether we handle it on our own terms, or allow it to become a destabilizing force, as it has elsewhere. With thoughtful strategy and clear national interest, we can avoid that fate.

This article was first published by 'Vzglyad' newspaper and was translated and edited by the RT team.

(RT.com)